Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk region has now been going on for six weeks. Despite initial criticism, there are signs that the invasion may be successful.

It is very difficult to understand the course of a military operation, even if you are there yourself. It is even more difficult when you are somewhere else, as both sides emphasize successes and downplay failures. When, for example, was the outcome and significance of the Battle of the Bulge understood? It took quite a while.

So it is too early to call Kursk a success or a failure, or even a draw. Nevertheless, there are indications from reliable analytical sources that the Ukrainian operation is having at least some effect on its main objective: to channel Russian forces from eastern Ukraine to Kursk and thus weaken its successful offensive in Donbass.

It is estimated that there is a significant movement of troops into Kursk Oblast. The Institute for War Research (ISW) cites Ukrainian estimates that the troop strength has risen from about 11,000 at the beginning of the invasion to around 40,000. The Ukrainians say another 20,000 are on the way.

According to ISW, Ukraine “forced the Russian military command to transfer troops from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and send newly formed forces from Russia to the area instead of to the Ukrainian front line.”

It is unclear how many of these additional men would otherwise have been deployed near the Russian target towns of Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar and other settlements, but there is evidence that at least some were diverted. For example, parts of the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, which fought near Pokrovsk, have been identified in Kursk.

Russia has deployed significant forces to retake the towns captured from Ukraine in Kursk, including marines and elite airborne troops. These efforts have faced fierce resistance from highly mobile Ukrainian special forces, which have played a critical role in repelling Russian advances and conducting counterattacks.

Ukraine reportedly continues to hold over 100 settlements and significant areas, while Russian forces struggle to organize a coordinated response, hampered by the vast distances and competing claims along the 960-kilometer front line in Ukraine. Ukraine has regained some ground, but not much.

Ukraine’s actions in Kursk were characterized by ambushes, precision strikes, and small unit tactics, taking advantage of its experience in asymmetric warfare. This type of warfare enabled Ukraine to disrupt Russian supply routes, particularly by attacking infrastructure such as bridges and roads in the Kursk region.

Ukrainian forces have also seized opportunities to weaken Russian defenses through drone strikes and long-range missiles. The destruction of several bridges over the Sejm has further complicated Russian efforts to organize a cohesive defense. Ukrainian special forces also destroyed one of Russia’s largest artillery and missile arsenals in a devastating explosion on September 17, the force of which was estimated at over 1.8 kilotons. The explosion triggered a shock wave that was felt nearly 300 kilometers away and reached a magnitude of about three on the Richter scale.

Despite some territorial gains by Russia in eastern Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk, its progress has slowed in recent days. It would be extraordinary if this were not the case.

Russia, while now offering large signing bonuses for recruits, is struggling to maintain its troop levels and faces a highly embarrassing occupation of its territory by a neighbor. Putin may not want to fall into the Ukrainian trap, but he may have no choice. Even 60,000 troops are unlikely to be enough to dislodge the Ukrainian army.

Ukrainian special forces are crucial to the Kursk operation. Trained in unconventional warfare, these elite units specialize in rapid strikes, intelligence gathering and destabilizing Russian lines.

Their successes in ambushing Russian troops, destroying supply convoys, and destroying ammunition and oil depots helped Ukraine hold onto its territory despite Russian attempts to recapture key locations. In addition, Ukrainian intelligence was crucial in identifying high-value Russian targets, leading to precision strikes that further undermined Russian troop morale.

The operations serve a dual purpose: not only do they have a direct impact on the battlefield by undermining Russia’s military strength, but they are also used as psychological warfare. The knowledge that Russian forces are unable to secure their own territory has contributed to growing discontent. Up to 150,000 Russian civilians have fled the region, leaving a vacuum that Ukraine is now beginning to fill by taking administrative control of several towns. These actions signal Ukraine’s intention to maintain a long-term presence in Kursk.

The Kremlin is in a difficult position. State-controlled media have struggled to create a coherent narrative of the invasion and often downplay the severity of the situation. However, the ongoing fighting – and Ukraine’s ability to hold its ground – has damaged Putin’s image at home. Kursk’s symbolic and strategic importance to Russia due to its proximity to Ukraine and its role as a logistical hub is increasing pressure on Moscow to reverse Ukrainian gains.

What could Ukraine do next? First, it could expand its information activities by broadcasting more aggressively into Russian-controlled areas, drawing attention to Russian military failures and Ukraine’s humanitarian efforts in the occupied territories. This could cause further discord among the Russian population, especially given the increasing economic hardships caused by the war.

Second, Ukraine could use its control over certain areas to facilitate desertions from Russian forces. The surrender of hundreds of Russian soldiers indicates a level of disillusionment that Ukraine could exploit through promises of security and humane treatment. Encouraging desertions and defections could accelerate the weakening of Russian military morale.

Finally, Ukraine’s ability to continue its precision strikes deep inside Russia while defending captured territories will be crucial.

The pressure on Russian supply lines, key military infrastructure and command centers will further decimate Russian forces and make it more difficult for the Kremlin to launch successful counteroffensives in the coming months. The longer Ukraine can hold Kursk, the greater the political and military risk for Moscow.

Doug Livermore is Senior Vice President of Solution Engineering at CenCore Group and the deputy commander for Special Operations Division – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as Director of Engagements for the Initiative for Irregular Warfarehe is National Director for External Communication of the Association of Special ForcesNational Vice President for the Special Operations Association of AmericaDirector of Development of Corioli Instituteand is Chairman of the Advisory Committee for No one is left behind.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army.

Europe’s edge is CEPA’s online journal covering major foreign policy issues in Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or views of the institutions he represents or of the Center for European Policy Analysis.